Crowdsourcing Quality Evolution Principles in Hierarchically-organized Networks
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摘要: 针对众包系统质量控制方法设计需要提供理论依据的问题,通过分析当前典型的众包分层组织管理模式,建立了众包虚拟组织间任务协作的演化博弈模型. 基于该模型分析众包质量的演化稳定性,讨论众包任务参与者协作行为的动态特征,并给出制约众包质量演化稳定性的3个关键因素,即完成众包任务获取的经济利益、任务请求者的消费效用以及任务完成者参与众包带来的安全风险对实现众包质量最大化的作用机理.Abstract: It is very important for crowdsourcing system to analyze crowdsourcing workers’ collaborative behaviors. In this paper, the evolutionary process of crowdsourcing quality was studied based on classic hierarchically-organized mode. By establishing an evolutionary game model for crowdsourcing task collaboration among different virtual organizations, the evolutionary stability of crowdsourcing systems was analyzed and the dynamics of crowdsourcing workers’ behaviors were discussed macroscopically. The key factors affecting the evolution of crowdsourcing system, including the economic benefits, consumer utilities from completing crowdsourcing tasks and risks from insecure participating, were suggested and how the factors work was presented. All these results together provide the theory basis for designing quality control methods of crowdsourcing system.
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Key words:
- crowdsourcing quality /
- hierarchical organization /
- evolutionary stability
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表 1 Clubi和Clubj间众包任务协作博弈的效用矩阵
Table 1. Utility matrix between Clubi and Clubj in crowdsourcing collaboration game
子点 Childj Coop NonCoop Childi Coop (Ui+ΔUi,Uj+ΔUj) (Ui+Bi-Ci,Uj) NonCoop (Ui, Uj+Bj -Cj) (Ui, Uj) 表 2 B-i-C-i>0且B-j-C-j>0时,均衡点O、P、Q、E、F的局部稳定性分析
Table 2. Local stability analysis of equilibrium point O,P,Q,E,F when B-i-C-i>0 and B-j-C-j>0
均衡点 det J的符号 tr J的符号 结果 O(0,0) + - 汇结点 P(0,1) + + 源结点 Q(1,0) + + 源结点 E(1,1) + - 汇结点 F(xF,yF) - 0 鞍点 表 3 B-i-C-i<0且B-j-C-j<0时,均衡点O、P、Q、E、F的局部稳定性分析
Table 3. Local stability analysis of equilibrium point O,P,Q,E,F when B-i-C-i<0 and B-j-C-j<0
均衡点 det J的符号 tr J的符号 结果 O(0,0) + + 源结点 P(0,1) - + 汇结点 Q(1,0) + - 汇结点 E(1,1) + + 源结点 F(xF,yF) - 0 鞍点 表 4 B-i-C-i>0且B-j-C-j<0时,均衡点O、P、Q、E、F的局部稳定性分析
Table 4. Local stability analysis of equilibrium point O,P,Q,E,F when B-i-C-i>0 and B-j-C-j<0
均衡点 det J的符号 tr J的符号 结果 O(0,0) - 鞍点 P(0,1) - 鞍点 Q(1,0) - 鞍点 E(1,1) - 鞍点 F(xF,yF) + 0 中心点 表 5 B-i-C-i<0且B-j-C-j>0时,均衡点O、P、Q、E、F的局部稳定性分析
Table 5. Local stability analysis of equilibrium point O,P,Q,E,F when B-i-C-i<0 and B-j-C-j>0
均衡点 det J的符号 tr J的符号 结果 O(0,0) - 鞍点 P(0,1) - 鞍点 Q(1,0) - 鞍点 E(1,1) - 鞍点 F(xF,yF) + 0 中心点 -
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