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分层组织管理下的众包质量演化机理

林莉

林莉. 分层组织管理下的众包质量演化机理[J]. 机械工程学报, 2017, 43(2): 237-243. doi: 10.11936/bjutxb2016070027
引用本文: 林莉. 分层组织管理下的众包质量演化机理[J]. 机械工程学报, 2017, 43(2): 237-243. doi: 10.11936/bjutxb2016070027
LIN Li. Crowdsourcing Quality Evolution Principles in Hierarchically-organized Networks[J]. JOURNAL OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, 2017, 43(2): 237-243. doi: 10.11936/bjutxb2016070027
Citation: LIN Li. Crowdsourcing Quality Evolution Principles in Hierarchically-organized Networks[J]. JOURNAL OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, 2017, 43(2): 237-243. doi: 10.11936/bjutxb2016070027

分层组织管理下的众包质量演化机理

doi: 10.11936/bjutxb2016070027
基金项目: 国家自然科学基金资助项目(61502017);国家“863”计划资助项目(2015AA016002)
详细信息
  • 中图分类号: TP393

Crowdsourcing Quality Evolution Principles in Hierarchically-organized Networks

  • 摘要: 针对众包系统质量控制方法设计需要提供理论依据的问题,通过分析当前典型的众包分层组织管理模式,建立了众包虚拟组织间任务协作的演化博弈模型. 基于该模型分析众包质量的演化稳定性,讨论众包任务参与者协作行为的动态特征,并给出制约众包质量演化稳定性的3个关键因素,即完成众包任务获取的经济利益、任务请求者的消费效用以及任务完成者参与众包带来的安全风险对实现众包质量最大化的作用机理.

     

  • 图  典型的众包系统分层组织管理结构

    Figure  1.  Classic layered organization management structure in crowdsourcing system

    图  Clubi和Clubj策略类型比例变化关系

    Figure  2.  Policy type proportion change in Clubi and Clubj

    图  Club间众包系统的动态演化图

    Figure  3.  Dynamic evolution of club-based crowdsourcing system

    表  1  Clubi和Clubj间众包任务协作博弈的效用矩阵

    Table  1.   Utility matrix between Clubi and Clubj in crowdsourcing collaboration game

    子点 Childj
    Coop NonCoop
    Childi Coop (Ui+ΔUi,Uj+ΔUj) (Ui+Bi-Ci,Uj)
    NonCoop (Ui, Uj+Bj -Cj) (Ui, Uj)
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  2  B-i-C-i>0且B-j-C-j>0时,均衡点OPQEF的局部稳定性分析

    Table  2.   Local stability analysis of equilibrium point O,P,Q,E,F when B-i-C-i>0 and B-j-C-j>0

    均衡点 det J的符号 tr J的符号 结果
    O(0,0) + - 汇结点
    P(0,1) + + 源结点
    Q(1,0) + + 源结点
    E(1,1) + - 汇结点
    F(xF,yF) - 0 鞍点
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  3  B-i-C-i<0且B-j-C-j<0时,均衡点OPQEF的局部稳定性分析

    Table  3.   Local stability analysis of equilibrium point O,P,Q,E,F when B-i-C-i<0 and B-j-C-j<0

    均衡点 det J的符号 tr J的符号 结果
    O(0,0) + + 源结点
    P(0,1) - + 汇结点
    Q(1,0) + - 汇结点
    E(1,1) + + 源结点
    F(xF,yF) - 0 鞍点
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  4  B-i-C-i>0且B-j-C-j<0时,均衡点OPQEF的局部稳定性分析

    Table  4.   Local stability analysis of equilibrium point O,P,Q,E,F when B-i-C-i>0 and B-j-C-j<0

    均衡点 det J的符号 tr J的符号 结果
    O(0,0) - 鞍点
    P(0,1) - 鞍点
    Q(1,0) - 鞍点
    E(1,1) - 鞍点
    F(xF,yF) + 0 中心点
    下载: 导出CSV

    表  5  B-i-C-i<0且B-j-C-j>0时,均衡点OPQEF的局部稳定性分析

    Table  5.   Local stability analysis of equilibrium point O,P,Q,E,F when B-i-C-i<0 and B-j-C-j>0

    均衡点 det J的符号 tr J的符号 结果
    O(0,0) - 鞍点
    P(0,1) - 鞍点
    Q(1,0) - 鞍点
    E(1,1) - 鞍点
    F(xF,yF) + 0 中心点
    下载: 导出CSV
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出版历程
  • 收稿日期:  2016-07-06
  • 网络出版日期:  2022-09-13
  • 刊出日期:  2017-02-01

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